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NOTES
ZONING LAWS AND THE CHURCH
Introduction
Legislation, the practical effect of which is to restrict the use of
private property without pecuniary compensation to the owner, has
assumed many forms, and has been sustained as a valid exercise of
police power.' The compensation to the restrained owner is found
in the share he enjoys in the common benefit received by all.2 The
scope of state police power has been extended in recent decades to
include zoning legislation. These laws have effected substantially
the growth and development of cities, towns and villages by dividing
them into residential, business and industrial districts, for the pur-
pose of preserving property values,3 and enabling their inhabitants
to live in a truly residential environment, free from the discomforts
of an industrial atmosphere.
Recently, some communities have endeavored to pervert the
purpose of zoning, by enacting ordinances excluding churches from
their residential districts, and even from the community entirely.4
Although this type of zoning law has not as yet been extensively em-
ployed, it would be well at this stage to examine its soundness, to
evaluate its merit, and to determine the probability of its acceptance
or rejection in the future.
In the analysis of such restrictive legislation, cases involving the
exclusion of other charitable institutions will be alluded to because
of the similar judicial treatment afforded them and the paucity of
law solely involving the church.
1 See BAssET, ZONING c. II, p. 26 (1936). This differs essentially from
the state's power of eminent domain which involves the power to appropriate
private property for a public use by compensating the owner of the seized
property, as provided by the United States Constitution.
2 See Collins v. Margate City, 3 N. J. 200, 69 A. 2d 708, 710 (1949).
8 The purpose is to preserve property values, not to increase them by zon-
ing legislation. See BASSET, ZONING C. IV, p. 52 (1936).
4 The ordinances listed below will serve as examples of this new type
legislation.
(a) Village of Orchard Lake, Michigan-the ordinance allowed churches,
under special permit only, in three zones comprising ten per cent of the village
area, while prohibiting them in the fourth zone containing the balance of the
village.
(b) City of Chico, California, Municipal Code of Chico § 1790(3)-the
ordinance established an R-1 district as a single family residence district, and
prohibited churches from being erected in the R-1 area.
(c) City of Mesa, Arizona-the ordinance set up a Class A residence dis-
trict in which schools, public libraries, and public museums were permitted,
while excluding churches from the district.
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Judicial Acceptance of Zoning Laws
When community zoning laws were first enacted, parties ad-
versely affected attacked their constitutionality, alleging a violation of
the due process clause of the federal and respective state constitu-
tions.5 The views of the state courts judging this new method of
property restriction were divided. Those jurisdictions which have
traditionally taken a liberal view of the scope of their police powers
had little difficulty in sustaining these zoning laws; 6 while others,
which permitted invasions of property rights only in cases of clear
necessity, held them invalid.7  It was apparent that this new type
legislation needed clarification. The first indication by the Supreme
Court of the United States of its future attitude toward zoning laws
is found in Welch v. Swasey.8 Here the Court upheld a regulation
requiring buildings in a residential area to be of a different height
than buildings in a commercial area. In a later case, a law prohibit-
ing an existing brick-yard from continuing its operation in the resi-
dential area, was declared valid by the Court although it did not con-
stitute a nuisance per se.9 In effect, this regulation was a limited
form of use zoning.'0 This apparently favorable attitude toward
zoning generally was somewhat curtailed in a decision declaring an
ordinance grounded in class discrimination unconstitutional."1 The
Court reasoned that since the true purpose of zoning is to divorce
5 Roman Realty Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Borough of Haddon-
field, 96 N. J. L. 117, 114 Atl. 248 (1921) ; People v. Kaul, 302 Ill. 317, 134
N. E. 740 (1922); Brett v. Building Commissioner of Brookline, 250 Mass.
73, 145 N. E. 269 (1924) ; City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill., 84, 149 N. E. 784(1925); Karke Realty Associates v. Mayor of Jersey City, 104 N. J. L. 173,
139 Atl. 55 (1927); Western Theological Seminary v. City of Evanston, 325
Il. 511, 156 N. E. 778 (1927); Applestein v. Osborne, 156 Md. 40, 143 Atl.
666 (1928).6 Brett v. Building Commissioner of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N. E.
269 (1924) ; City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 IIl. 84, 149 N. E. 784 (1925).
7Roman Realty Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Borough of Haddon-
field, 96 N. J. L. 117, 114 Atl. 248 (1921); Karke Realty Association v.
Mayor of Jersey City, 104 N. J. L. 173, 139 Atl. 55 (1927) ; City of Atlanta v.
Smith, 165 Ga. 146, 140 S. E. 369 (1927).8 214 U. S. 91 (1909).
9 Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U. S. 394 (1915); City of Atlanta v.
Smith, 165 Ga. 146, 140 S. E. 369 (1927).10 Use zoning refers to the use to which the ordinance will allow the land to
be put. The use districts are usually divided into residential, business and in-
dustrial. In the instant case, the land on which the brick-yard was located
was deemed a residential use area, therefore the brick-yard was a non-
conforming use.
1 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917); accord, Harmon v. Tyler,
273 U. S. 668 (1926); City of Richmond v. Dean, 281 U. S. 704 (1926); City
of Birmingham v. Monk, 185 F. 2d 859 (5th Cir. 1951). The zoning law in the
Bucl anan case by its first section, made it unlawful for any colored person to
move into and occupy as a residence, place of abode, or to establish and main-
tain as a place of public assembly any house upon any block upon which a
greater number of houses are occupied as residences, places of abode, or places
NOTES
home life from business activity, it cannot be utilized to further the
bigotry of a group.12 However, it was not until 1926 in the case of
the Fillage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 13 that the Supreme
Court expressed its plenary approval of zoning laws. This was the
first case presented to this tribunal which put in issue the validity of
a comprehensive use zoning plan encompassing an entire community.
The Court held that zoning legislation is a proper subject of police
power,' 4 and that the ordinance in its general scope and dominant
features was valid. While giving this blanket approval to zoning
laws generally, the Court pointed out that the validity of a specific
regulation must be determined by the facts in each case. The test
laid down for determining the validity of each regulation is its sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals and general wel-
fare of the community.' 5 It is significant to note that the Court in
the Ambler case specifically omitted from its consideration the por-
tion of the zoning ordinance relating to churches.' 6 The holding re-
lates solely to provisions restricting industrial and profit-making
enterprises. On the strength of this decision zoning law enactments
greatly increased, and the previously dissentious state courts eventu-
ally accepted this progressive legislation.' 7
The criterion for validity set forth in the Ambler decision has
been relied on by the Supreme Court in later cases.'3 And while
there is a presumption of constitutionality of zoning legislation en-
of public assembly by white people than are occupied as residences, places of
abode, or places of public assembly by colored people. Section two contained
a similar prohibition against white people, where the greater number of houses
are occupied by colored people.
12 See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 80 (1917). The advocates of
this law said it tended to promote public peace by preventing racial conflicts;
that it tended to maintain racial purity, and that it prevented the deterioration
of property owned and occupied 'by white people. The court found these rea-
sons insufficient to support the legislation.
13272 U. S. 365 (1926).
141d. at 387. "Regulations [zoning ordinances] . . . half a century ago,
probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. . . . While
the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their ap-
plication must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions
which are constantly coming within the field of their operation."
L5 Id. at 395.
16 Id. at 385. "For present purposes the provision of the ordinance in re-
spect of [sic] these uses [churches and schools] may, therefore, be put aside
as unnecessary to be considered." While considering the remainder of the
ordinance, the court thought it prudent not to pass upon this delicate aspect,
since it was not absolutely necessary to the decision in the instant case.
ir See Howden v. Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah, 172 Ga. 833, 159
S. E. 401 (1931); Duffcon Concrete Products, Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill,
1 N. J. 509, 64 A. 2d 347 (1949) ; Guaclides v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs,
11 N. J. Super. 405, 78 A. 2d 435 (1951).
Is Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U. S. 603 (1927); Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U. S. 183 (1928).
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acted pursuant to the police power,19 such legislation must in fact
comply with the constitutional test set forth in the Ambler opinion.
This test acts as a safeguard against the unwarranted use of zoning
laws for illegitimate ends.
Federal Cases
Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge,20 which involved a zoning ordi-
nance imposing a restriction on the admission of a charitable institu-
tion into a residential area, is the only case in which this type of
legislation has reached the Supreme Court for analysis. One section
of the ordinance considered there provided that such an institution
could be established therein only by the written consent of two-thirds
of the surrounding property owners. The Court held this section of
the zoning law unconstitutional, since it failed to provide a standard
by which to govern the decision of these owners, thus relegating any
decision to their whim or caprice. The Supreme Court, therefore, did
not pass on the constitutionality of the purpose of this type zoning
ordinance, but declared the means used to be violative of the due proc-
ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, when this same
type of ordinance was previously considered by a lower federal court,
it unhesitatingly declared the purpose of the law invalid as being
unreasonable and bearing no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals and general welfare, 21 rejecting the plaintiff's argu-
ment that an institution attended by children of a particular race or
creed is harmful to a community. In a later case, Judge Kenyon
reiterating the true purpose of zoning ordinances declared that they
are "made necessary by the tremendous industrial and business de-
velopment of the country. The people of cities are entitled to some
protection for their homes ... and from the conglomeration of nerve-
destroying . . . development; hence residential districts are estab-
lished where people may have a reasonably quiet home life." 22 That
no other objective would be given judicial sanction was made evident
in the Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Society v. Kansas City, Mo.
case.23 The zoning ordinance there prohibited a home, in a residen-
tial area, to be utilized for sheltering aged ladies. Holding this law
invalid the court asserted that it was predicated on the feelings of the
people in a particular section against an eleemosynary institution
being located in their area. The regulation was denounced as a
vehicle of exclusiveness, which is not a valid objective of zoning.
'
9 Gorieb v. Fox, stpra note 18 at 608.
20278 U. S. 116 (1928).
2 1 Village of University Heights v. Cleveland Jewish Orphans' Home, 20
F. 2d 743 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 569 (1927).22 American Wood Products Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 35 F. 2d 657, 660
(1929) (emphasis added).
23 58 F. 2d 593 (8th Cir. 1932).
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A case involving an ordinance excluding a church from a resi-
dential area has not as yet been presented to a federal tribunal. Yet
every ordinance attempting to exclude a charitable institution from
a residential zone has been held to be invalid. The federal tribunals
have kept clearly in mind the true purpose of zoning, i.e., the sep-
aration of residential areas from a detrimental business atmosphere,
and have not permitted alien factors to cloud the issue.
State Courts
The state tribunals have generally permitted charitable institu-
tions to establish themselves in residential areas in contravention of
existing zoning laws, while at the same time avoiding the issue of
their constitutionality. This was accomplished by granting a vari-
ance,24 by invoking an estoppel against the enforcement of the law,25
by setting aside the ordinance as an unlawful delegation of author-
ity,2 6 by construing the law as not prohibiting churches,27 and by
dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction by the court.28  The
means employed by other tribunals for avoiding this delicate consti-
tutional problem are open to reproach. In one instance a zoning
law actively enforced over a two-year period was held invalid when
its provisions were employed to prevent the erection of a church; 29
while in another case a seemingly valid law was rejected when ques-
tioned by a church, for vesting arbitrary discretion in the land-
owners.3 0 It Is noteworthy that this attitude of forbearance adopted
24 See Thomson v. Tafel, 309 Ky. 753, 218 S. W. 2d 977 (1949) ; Board of
Zoning Appeals of City of Indianapolis v. Wheaton, 118 Ind. App. 38, 76
N. E. 2d 597 (1948) ; Keeling v. Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Indian-
apolis, 117 Ind. App. 314, 69 N. E. 2d 613 (1946).
25 See Phipps v. City of Chicago, 339 Ill. 315, 171 N. E. 289 (1930);
Western Theological Seminary v. City of Evanston, 325 Ill. 511, 156 N. E.
778 (1927).
26 See Pentecostal Holiness Church of Montgomery v. Dunn, 248 Ala. 314,
27 So. 2d 561 (1946); R. C. Archbishop for Diocese of Oregon v. Baker,
140 Ore. 600, 15 P. 2d 391 (1932) ; City Council of City of Denver v. United
Negroes Protective Association, 76 Colo. 86, 230 Pac. 598 (1924). The issue
of constitutionality being treated in this article is the validity of the purpose
of the law. and not the means used to enforce it.
27 See State v. Meador, 154 W. Va. 368, 154 S. E. 876 (1930).
28 See Phelps v. Board of Appeals of City of Chicago, 325 Ill. 625, 156
N. E. 826 (1927).
29 State v. Edgcomb, 108 Neb. 859, 189 N. W. 617 (1922).3 0 Pentecostal Holiness Church of Montgomery v. Dunn, 248 Ala. 314, 27
So. 2d 561, 564 (1946). The zoning law subjected the decision of the prop-
erty owner to the following review: "Provided, that in cases where the prop-
erty owner or owners whose unanimous consent is required, fails [sicl to state
his or their objection, or should his or their objection seem to be trivial . ..
then the city commission reserves the right to notify . . . the parties in in-
terest of the place and time of such hearing before the city commission, and
if at such hearing the objections of the property owner or owners shall seem
trivial or not well taken, the city commission reserves the right to overrule
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by these courts, although evasive on the constitutional issue, did,
nevertheless, extricate the church from the prohibition of the zoning
regulation.31 Some courts, however, have passed upon their consti-
tutionality, and these decisions will now be considered.
A. Partially Restrictive Ordinances
A zoning ordinance, the practical effect of which is to exclude
churches from the residential district though permitting them in
other parts of the community, is the type most commonly presented
to the courts. The majority of those jurisdictions which have passed
directly on the constitutionality of such ordinances have held them to
be unconstitutional, for the reason that the exclusion of a church
bears no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare . 2  The policy of excluding churches from residen-
tial areas though allowing them in business areas was rejected by an
Ohio court as being violative of the due process clause of the state
and federal constitutions.3 3  Describing the future effect of the ordi-
nance, if enforced, the court recognized that ". . . what respondents
are seeking to accomplish is the creation, by an administrative act,
of exclusive residential subdivisions for private individuals. It is
true that many people prefer not to reside next door to a church ....
We must not 'employ the new device of zoning to make exclusive
districts much more exclusive.' 84
The rationale of the minority view, holding such zoning legis-
lation constitutional,36 is set forth in the City of Porterville decision.3 6
The plaintiff was denied permission by the zoning authorities to erect
a church in an area zoned exclusively for single-family dwellings.3
7
such objections, and to instruct the city engineer to issue a permit for the
proposed improvement."
31 But see Galfas v. Ailor, 206 Ga. 76, 55 S. E. 2d 582 (1949).
32 City of Sherman v. Simms, 183 S. W. 2d 415 (Tex. 1944); State v.
Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N. E. 2d 515 (1942); State v. Hill, 59 Nev. 231,
90 P. 2d 217 (1939) ; see O'Brien v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill. App. 45, 105 N. E.
2d 917, 920 (1952); Ellsworth v. Gerke, 62 Ariz. 198, 156 P. 2d 242, 244
(1945).
3 State v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N. E. 2d 515 (1942).
34 Id. at 524.
35 City of Chico v. First Avenue Baptist Church of Chico, 238 P. 2d 587
(Cal. 1951); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P. 2d 823,
appeal dismissed, 338 U. S. 805 (1949); see Mooney v. Village of Orchard
Lake, 53 N. W. 2d 308, 309 (Mich. 1952).
86 The court in the Chico case merely repeated the reasoning of the Porter-
ville bench. Therefore, an analysis of the reasoning employed in the Porterville
case will be sufficient.
37 The City of Porterville ordinance, as far as it is germane, is as follows:
R-1, single family residences; R-2, duplex or two-family residences; R-3,
multiple residences; R-4, unlimited residences. Churches were relegated to the
R-4 district only.
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On appeal, the District Court, with two of the five judges dissenting,
held that "[s] uch a zoning regulation bears a substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals and general welfare because it tends
to promote and perpetuate the American home and protect its civic
and social values." 38 In support of this statement, the court relied
on the prior decision in Miller v. Board of Public Works, 39 which
held that a community could establish a one-family residential dis-
trict and exclude therefrom general business enterprises, apartments,
tenements, and like structures. Apparently, the majority of the
court in the Porterville case considered the church a "like" structure.
But, although the court in the Miller case reasoned that a purely
residential district would perpetuate the American home, it went on
to explain that ". . the very existence of a nation depends upon the
character and calibre of its citizenry . . . . With ownership comes
increased interest in the promotion of public agencies, such as church
and school, which have for their purpose a desired development of
the moral and mental makeup of the citizenry of the country." 40
Thus, one of the reasons set forth by the court for sustaining this
type of zoning regulation was that it would thereby encourage the
support of institutions like a church. Yet, the majority of the court
in the Porterville opinion, ostensibly adopting the conclusion of the
Miller case, completely frustrates the motivating force behind the lat-
ter decision. It is submitted, that since the court in the Porterville
case cited no other authority for its holding, it remains an unsup-
ported opinion, which probably does not represent the existing law
in that jurisdiction. The view that exclusion of churches from resi-
dential neighborhoods will promote the American home is a philos-
ophy alien to the United States, since our constitution is based upon
fundamental principles of natural law.41  Moreover, it is a generally
accepted concept that the church and family supplement each other,
and should be accessible to each other.
B. Totally Restrictive Ordinances
The second type ordinance, less frequently considered judicially,
prohibits the erection of churches anywhere in the entire community.
The courts have been unanimous in declaring this type ordinance
invalid.4 2  A Michigan court held the enactment unreasonable on
38 Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P. 2d 823, 825,
appeal dismissed, 338 U. S. 805 (1949) (emphasis added).
39 195 Cal. App. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925).
40 Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
41 See Corwin, Debt of American Constitution Law to Natural Law Con-
cepts, 25 NomE DAmE LAW. 258 (1950); Manion, The Fonnding Fathers and
the Natural Law: A Study of the Source of Our Legal Institutes, 35 A. B.
A. J. 461 (1949).42 Mooney v. Village of Orchard Lake, 53 N. W. 2d 308 (Mich. 1952) ; see
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its face, thereby rebutting the presumption of constitutionality attach-
ing to state regulations. 43  In view of the judicial attitude toward
those laws excluding churches only from a residential area,44 regu-
lations excluding them from the entire community are clearly
unconstitutional.
Even where churches have successfully extricated themselves
from the restrictive ordinances and were permitted to establish them-
selves in residential districts, a problem was raised as to whether or
not foreseeable appurtenances, such as the parish house, school and
convent, would likewise escape the bar of the regulation. Judicial
expressions have indicated that these structures accompany a church
as a matter of right.45 It has been held that a convent must be con-
sidered an integral part of a church project-vi., a church, parish
house and school. 46 The position taken in these opinions is reason-
able and will undoubtedly serve as a guide to courts confronted with
this issue in the future.
Rebutting the Presumption of Constitutionality
These zoning laws have been enacted to obtain an "exclusive"
district in every community. 47 Relying on the presumption of con-
stitutionality accompanying such legislation,48 the laws were shaped
to attain the personal desires of a group. However, zoning laws
will only be upheld if in fact they bear a substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals and general welfare. Do these laws
meet this test?
It has been indicated that the general welfare of the community
as a whole will not be promoted by relegating churches solely to the
business districts,49 characteristically crowded and noisy, and removed
North Shore Unitarian Society, Inc. v. Village of Plandome, 200 Misc. 524,
525, 109 N. Y. S. 2d 803, 804 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
43 Mooney v. Village of Orchard Lake, 53 N. W. 2d 308 (Mich. 1952).
4 See note 31 supra.
45 See Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Indianapolis v. Wheaton, 118
Ind. App. 38, 76 N. E. 2d 597 (1948); cf. Keeling v. Board of Zoning Appeals
of City of Indianapolis, 117 Ind. App. 314, 69 N. E. 2d 613, 618 (1946) ; Scott
Co. v. R_ C. Archbishop for Diocese of Oregon, 83 Ore. 97, 163 Pac. 88
(1917) ; Western Theological Seminary v. City of Evanston, 325 Ill. 511, 156
N. E. 778 (1927). See also BASSET, ZONING C. IV, p. 100 (1936).
46 See Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Indianapolis v. Wheaton, 118
Ind. App. 38, 76 N. E. 2d 597 (1948).
47 See State v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N. E. 2d 515, 524 (1942);
Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Society v. Kansas City, Missouri, 58 F. 2d
593, 603 (8th Cir. 1932); cf. Trust Company of Chicago v. City of Chicago,
408 Ill. 91, 96 N. E. 2d 499, 506 (1951). See also BASSET, ZONING C. IV, p. 72
(1936).
48 See note 18 supra.
49 See State v. City of Tampa, 48 So. 2d 78, 80 (Fla. 1950) ; State v. Joseph,
139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N. E. 2d 515, 524 (1942) ; City of Sherman v. Simms, 183
S. W. 2d 415, 417 (Tex. 1944). See also note 61 infra.
NOTES
from the home life with which the church is so intimately connected.
Admittedly, such legislation may promote the particular welfare of
the group desiring its enactment, but as indicated previously, a zoning
ordinance to be valid must be comprehensive and designed to benefit
the entire community.50 That the church will generally further pub-
lic nwrality rather than have a detrimental effect thereon, is a gen-
erally accepted principle. l
The proponents of these restrictive laws assert that noise, con-
fusion and increases in traffic resulting from church activities will
adversely affect the health and safety of the inhabitants in the com-
munity. These superficial claims have been rejected by many tri-
bunals,5 2 and a Florida court summarily dismissed the argument as
being de ininimis in nature53 Perhaps the only sound arguments
in support of this legislation are that the exclusion of churches will
preserve an attractive community, and prevent depreciation of ad-
jacent property values. The theory that aesthetic considerations are
alone sufficient to justify the enactment of a zoning law, has gained
support in recent years. 54 However, the weight of authority con-
siders aesthetic concepts merely a factor to be considered in framing
a zoning ordinance, and are insufficient by themselves to justify such
legislation. 5r Regarding the second argument, while it is true that
one of the objectives of zoning is the overall preservation of property
50 Guaclides v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 11 N. J. Super. 405, 78 A.
2d 435 (1951); Trust Company of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 403 Ill. 91,
96 N. E. 2d 499 (1951); see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U. S. 365, 390 (1926) ; City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N. E. 784, 788(1925).
51 See State v. City of Tampa, 48 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1950) ; State v. Joseph,
139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N. E. 2d 515, 523 (1942).52See State v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N. E. 2d 515 (1942); Mooney
v. Village of Orchard Lake, 53 N. W. 2d 308 (Mich. 1952); State v. Hill,
59 Nev. 231, 90 P. 2d 217 (1939); City of Sherman v. Simms, 183 S. W.
2d 415 (Tex. 1944).
53 "The contention that people congregating for religious purposes cause
such congestion as to create a traffic hazard has very little in substance to
support it. Religious services are normally for brief periods two or three
days in the week and this at hours when traffic is lightest--early in the morning,
early in the evening and at 10:00 and 11:00 on Sundays." State v. City of
Tampa, 48 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1950).54 Town of Lexington v. Governor, 295 Mass. 31, 3 N. E. 2d 19 (1936);
Thompson v. City of Carrolton, 211 S. W. 2d 970 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948);
Connor v. City of University Park, 142 S. W. 2d 706 (Tex. 1940). See Sayre,
Aesthetics and Property Values: Does Zoning Promote the Public Welfare?
35 A. B. A. J. 471 (1949). The author has opined that aesthetics are an aspect
of morals, and should be a standard for determining the validity of a zoning
ordinance.
55 See Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Society v. Kansas City, Missouri,
58 F. 2d 593 (1932) ; Trust Company of Chicago v. City of Chicago. 408 Ill.
91, 96 N. E. 2d 499 (1951); Guaclides v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 11
N. J. Super. 405. 78 A. 2d 435 (1951) ; Frischkorn Construction Co. v. Lam-
bert, 315 Mich. 556, 24 N. W. 2d 209 (1946) ; Baker v. Somerville, 138 Neb.
466, 293 N. W. 236 (1940).
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values, nevertheless, if the effect of an ordinance is to depreciate the
value of particular properties, this will not render the law invalid. 58
The zoning laws themselves adversely affect some realty, and even if
the existence of a church will have a similar effect, it logically fol-
lows that the depreciation caused by a church is not fatally inconsis-
tent with zoning, and exclusion is not necessary to effectuate a com-
prehensive zoning plan. So the fact of depreciation is not a
conclusive test of the validity of these regulations. Therefore, these
laws fail in fact to comply with the test of constitutionality, and it is
submitted have rightfully been rejected.
While all the reported cases have been resolved solely on the
issue of due process, in some of them, the defense of freedom of
worship was raised.5 7 There is strong dicta in one case, that to ex-
clude a church from a residential area would violate freedom of
worship.58 This aspect has been virtually untested, and if more fully
exploited could prove to be an additional sword in the hands of the
denouncers of such legislation.
Conclusion
It is submitted that if this legislation were presented to the
Supreme Court, the Court would declare it to be inconsistent with
American philosophical and social values, to contravene the purpose
of zoning, and strike it down as being violative of due process. It
would seem that this opinion is not unwarranted in view of the treat-
ment afforded charitable institutions in the Supreme and Federal
Courts,59 the weight of authority by state judicial decision,60 and the
position taken by the leading text writers. 1 Nor should the impli-
56Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
57 See City of Chico v. First Avenue Baptist Church of Chico, 238 P. 2d
587 (Cal. 1951) ; Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P. 2d
823, appeal dismissed, 338 U. S. 805 (1949); Galfas v. Ailor, 206 Ga. 76, 55
S. E. 2d 582 (1949) ; State v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N. E. 2d 515 (1942) ;
Sexton v. Bates, 17 N. J. Super. 246, 85 A. 2d 833 (1951) ; City of Sherman
v. Simms, 183 S. W. 2d 415 (Tex. 1944).
58 City of Sherman v. Simms, 183 S. W. 2d 415, 417 (Tex. 1944). But see
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P. 2d 823, 825, appeal
dismissed, 338 U. S. 805 (1949) ; City of Chico v. First Avenue Baptist Church
of Chico, 238 P. 2d 587, 589 (Cal. 1951).
59 See notes 20, 21 and 23 supra.
60 See note 32 supra.
a' See YoIELY, ZONING LAW AND PRAcTIcE § 183 (1948); BAssEr, ZONING
c. IV, p. 70 (1936). " ... [I]t did not occur to them [framers of New York
Zoning Law] that there was the remotest possibility that churches, schools,
and hospitals could properly be excluded from any districts. It was also rec-
ognized that churches should be in quiet localities, and as they are so inti-
mately connected with home life, they should be in home communities." See
also Note, 138 A. L. R. 1288 (1942).
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cations latent in these restrictive type zoning ordinances be over-
looked. The people living in small communities need not concern
themselves with the possibility of churches overrunning their village.
The percentage of people of a particular denomination residing in
that community, plus the cost of building a church, will keep their
number at a minimum. Conversely, if this legislation were upheld,
it would theoretically be possible to legislate this country into atheism.
But rather than await a judicial determination by the Supreme Court,
a more speedy and efficient remedy has been resorted to by the State
of Massachusetts. This jurisdiction has enacted a state-wide statute
which declares invalid any ordinance prohibiting the use of land for
church purposes.62 Such a declaration of public policy should be
promulgated in all the states, and this will prevent the enactment of
this bigoted legislation.
SOME ASPECTS OF PUBLIC BIDDING LAW IN NEW YORK
Introduction
Public bidding contracts are those entered into after submitting
advertisements to the public and executed between a successful bid-
der and the state, its political subdivisions or agencies. They are
governed, in general, by the principles applicable to all contracts and,
whenever such instruments come before the courts, the rights and
obligations of the contracting parties will usually be adjusted on the
same principles as if both were private persons.' A statute requiring
competitive bidding is based upon motives of public economy and of
the mistrust of the officers to whom the duty of making contracts for
the public service was committed. Such a statute or charter is de-
signed to preclude favoritism and jobbing,2 and to protect the con-
stituent body from corruption and improvidence.3 While public con-
tracts are, in general, governed by the same rules as private contracts,
they differ greatly in many respects. Thus, where the defense of
ultra vires will not be sustained in an action on an executed contract
62 "No by-law or ordinance which prohibits or limits the use of land for
any church or other religious purpose or which prohibits or limits the use of
land for any religious, sectarian or denominational educational purpose shall
be valid." MAss. ANN. STAT. c. 325, § 1 (1950).
1 See People ex rel. Graves v. Sohmer, 207 N. Y. 450, 457, 101 N. E. 164,
166 (1913) ; People v. Stephens, 71 N. Y. 527, 537 (1878).2 See Brady v. Mayor of New York, 20 N. Y. 312, 316 (1859).
3 See Donovan v. City of New York, 33 N. Y. *291, *292 (1865).
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